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Comprehensive Protection of Genetic 
Information 
ONE SIZE PRIVACY OR PROPERTY MODELS MAY 
NOT FIT ALL 
Anya E.R. Prince† 
INTRODUCTION 
Genetic information is uniquely personal—it helps 
define what characteristics one will develop, what traits 
individuals could pass on to their offspring, and, given recent 
advances in science, it increasingly helps one to learn about 
medical predispositions and disease treatment options. The 
medical definition of genetic information is the heritable 
information coded in an individual’s genes or DNA. Given both 
the personal nature of this information and the potential jackpot 
of valuable medical data, individuals have an important interest 
in maintaining control over their genetic information. Genetic 
information, however, is simultaneously uniquely individual and 
inexorably entwined with family members. Additionally, genetic 
information in the aggregate provides colossal potential to 
advance medical research and public health outcomes. Thus, 
laws that give individuals rights over their genetic information 
must balance the competing interests of the personal nature of 
the information against the informational power of genetic data. 
Current state laws in this arena generally grant individuals 
either a property interest or a privacy interest in genetic data. 
This article examines these state laws and argues that sweeping 
rights to genetic information under either a property or a 
privacy model are often overbroad and miss the mark, 
especially given the complexities of familial relationships and 
the societal implications arising out of genetic data. 
 
 † Post-doctoral Fellow, Center for Genomics and Society, UNC-Chapel Hill. I 
would like to thank Tiffany Wu, Meghan Glaspy, and Rachel Cox for research 
assistance; and Michael Waterstone, Shawn Kravich, and Jen Flory for feedback. 
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The number of genetic tests available has ballooned to 
over 2,000 tests in use in the clinical setting.1 Additionally, in 
the future, more healthcare professionals will utilize wide-scale 
genetic testing in clinical practice as the cost of whole genome 
sequencing drops to below $1,000 per test.2 As the use of 
genetic testing increases in the clinical setting, powerful 
information about predispositions to disease and implications 
for offspring will emerge in patient files and medical records. 
While this information can greatly improve treatment options 
and public health, it also implicates privacy and discrimination 
concerns for the patients themselves. 
Information gathered from genetic tests and family 
medical history can provide a patient with vital information 
about his or her propensity to develop a disease such as cancer, 
diabetes, or Alzheimer’s. It can also provide information about 
whether a parent is a carrier of a gene that can lead to a genetic 
disorder in offspring, such as Tay-Sachs or cystic fibrosis. This 
knowledge gives power to the individual to plan for the future, 
establish treatment options, and practice preventive care. For 
these reasons, genetic information is personal and complexly 
intertwined with self-identity and family. Despite the 
individuality of genetic information, the information that is 
beneficial to the patient may also be desirable knowledge for 
other actors—precisely because of its identifying power. 
Therefore, it is essential to examine how current laws 
address concerns over control of genetic information, what the 
best model is for protection of individuals’ rights, and how 
protections need to be improved for the future. Currently, the 
premier law in the United States at the federal level regarding 
genetic privacy is the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
of 2008 (GINA).3 GINA bans health insurance companies and 
employers from discriminating against individuals based on 
genetic information. Additionally, absent a few limited exceptions, 
GINA prohibits health insurance companies and employers from 
collecting the genetic information of individuals.4 
While GINA has helped to alleviate some fears over 
misuse of genetic information, it is relatively narrower in scope 
 
 1 Genomic Testing, CNTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
www.cdc.gov/genomics/gtesting/ (last updated Apr. 23, 2013). 
 2 See Erika C. Hayden & Nature News Blog, The $1,000 Human Genome: Are We 
There Yet?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 10, 2012), www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=1000-genome. 
 3 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 
§ 2(5), 122 Stat. 881, 882-83 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 4 Id. 
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than other civil rights acts because it only regulates health 
insurance companies and employers. With the burgeoning use of 
genetic testing and advances in understanding hereditary links 
for disease, laws need to address how the broader society—from 
government to educational institutions to researchers to nosy 
neighbors—can use an individual’s genetic information in 
contexts outside of health insurance and employment. 
There has been a recent increase in genetic rights 
legislation as states have begun to grapple with the question of 
what rights individuals have to their genetic information.5 
Most states have enacted legislation regulating third party use 
of genetic information; however, the majority of these statutes 
mirror GINA in that they only address health insurance 
companies and employers. Fifteen states have passed broader 
legislation that endows individuals with more comprehensive 
control over their genetic information.6 Of these states, five 
provide individuals with a property interest7 in their genetic 
data and 10 grant a privacy interest.8 This article argues that 
the laws are so broadly written that they may become 
unworkable in practice and therefore will fail to adequately 
protect individuals and their genetic interests. State legislatures 
would benefit from a narrowly-tailored model law that addresses 
individuals’ concerns. Additionally, states should create regulations 
for areas such as newborn screening, paternity testing, and law 
enforcement biobanks9 to ensure full protection for individuals in 
all situations. 
Part I of the article discusses the varying definitions of 
genetic information and how these variations affect individual 
rights over genetic information. Part II examines property 
rights and privacy rights in the context of genetic information. 
This part highlights the benefits and concerns of these two 
models, and evaluates how the differences in their underlying 
theories affect the protections and control individuals have. 
 
 5 Dan Vorhaus, Is the Genetic Rights Movement Picking up Steam?, 
GENOMICS L. REP., (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2011/
03/16/is-the-genetic-rights-movement-picking-up-steam/. 
 6 Given the wide range of types of protections available, this number could 
vary depending on how comprehensive legislation is viewed. This article counts those 
states whose laws apply broadly across society—not those whose legislation applies to 
more limited cases of insurance, employment, or family codes. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 7 These states include Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana. 
See infra Part III.B. 
 8 Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, and South Dakota. See infra Part III.C. 
 9 Law enforcement biobanks are databases housing the biological and 
genetic information of arrestees and criminals. See infra Part III.D.3. 
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Part III analyzes state and federal laws that have expanded 
the rights individuals have over their genetic information and 
examines proposed state laws that seek to do the same. The 
section also comments on important exemptions that should be 
written into model legislation, such as newborn screening, 
paternity testing, and law enforcement biobanks. Finally, Part 
IV sets forth essential provisions that model state legislation 
must have in order to guarantee comprehensive genetic rights 
for individuals. Accordingly, model legislation for genetic 
information should include prohibitions on discrimination in 
major areas of the law, criminalize surreptitious genetic 
testing, create a private right of action for the unwanted 
disclosure of genetic information, and require that doctors and 
scientists provide subjects with an “advance research directive” 
to ensure that individuals will have greater control over the 
use of their genetic information in research. 
I. PIN THE TAIL ON THE DEFINITION: GENETIC 
INFORMATION, GENETIC CHARACTERISTICS, AND 
GENETIC MATERIAL 
Due to the patchwork nature of laws in this arena, there 
are varying definitions of genetic information at the state and 
federal level. This article focuses upon genetic information—
intangible information that comes from DNA analysis, family 
medical history, test results, and other sources. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to discuss in detail the regulation of 
physical genetic material, such as tissue, blood samples, or 
other physical biological specimen, as this topic has been 
analyzed in other academic works.10 
In 2008, Congress greatly expanded protection against 
genetic discrimination at the federal level by broadly defining 
genetic information in GINA. Under GINA, genetic information 
is 
 
 10 Other academic literature discusses individual rights in the realm of 
physical genetic material—especially given a California Supreme Court ruling in Moore 
v. Univ. Cal. Regents, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a patient has no right to 
monetary shares from a commercialized cell line developed from his cells). See, e.g., 
Michael M.J. Lin, Note, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material: 
Stepping Into the Future With the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 109 (1996); 
Erik B. Seeney, Note, Moore 10 Years Later—Still Trying to Fill the Gap: Creating A 
Personal Property Right in Genetic Material, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1131 (1998); Jeffery 
Lawrence Weeden, Note, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting Genetic 
Information, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 611 (2006). 
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information about [an] individual’s genetic tests[,] the genetic tests 
of family members of such individual, and []  the manifestation of a 
disease or disorder in family members of such individual[;] . . . any 
request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical 
research which includes genetic services, by such individual or any 
family member of such individual.11  
Prior to GINA, a patchwork of federal and state laws covered 
genetic discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability in 
employment. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) had indicated that the ADA could be used 
to bring an action for genetic discrimination, but this was never 
tested in court prior to the passage of GINA.12 Additionally, in 
2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order No. 13145 
banning genetic discrimination against federal employees.13 
The protections in the health insurance context were 
even sparser than in employment. The Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) prohibits group 
health insurers from using medical information in underwriting. 
HIPAA, however, does not prevent health insurers from 
charging a higher premium based on medical conditions. While 
some states had laws that regulated the use of genetic 
information in employment and health insurance, the bills 
were not consistent across the country. GINA filled many gaps 
in the law that existed prior to its passage. 
Additionally, prior to GINA, many states had a narrow 
definition of genetic information, creating a confusing 
patchwork of coverage at the state level. The varying state 
definitions of genetic information were mostly limited to genetic 
test results or information directly gathered from 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis.  
An examination of three states shows the breadth of 
definitions that exist at the state level. Nebraska’s concise 
definition of genetic information is “information about a gene, 
gene product, or inherited characteristic derived from a genetic 
test.”14 New Mexico’s slightly broader definition includes 
information gathered from “genetic testing, genetic analysis, DNA 
composition, participation in genetic research or use of genetic 
services.”15 And finally, under Tennessee law, genetic 
 
 11 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (2011). 
 12 Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in 
Employment, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 837, 838 (2008). 
 13 Exec. Order No. 13145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000). 
 14 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-551(6)(a) (West 2007). 
 15 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-2D (2005). 
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information must stem from genetic test results and also be 
linked to genes that are associated with a specific disease 
predisposition, a requirement that is not explicitly included in 
all state definitions of genetics.16 The varying state definitions of 
genetic testing can be confusing for many, especially individuals 
who may move from one state to another and have varying 
levels of protection, or for genetic researchers who work with 
research subjects from multiple states. Model legislation for 
this area would help to minimize confusion and increase 
consistency of protection. 
Increased legislation at the federal level can help to 
create a trickle-down use of definitions at the state level. By 
including family medical history and use of genetic services in 
its definition, GINA has begun to alter society’s conception of 
genetic information. For individuals with family histories of 
hereditary diseases, actual legal protection is very limited if 
genetic information based on test results is protected, but 
information of family medical history is not. For example, an 
insurance company that asks extensive questions about an 
individual’s family medical history of cancer can gain vital 
information about that person’s predisposition to cancer without 
having a definitive genetic test result, such as a BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 mutation test for breast cancer, or an HNPCC (hereditary 
non-polyposis colorectal cancer) test for colon cancer.17 Therefore, 
to ensure more complete protection of individual rights, the 
definition of genetic information should include not just genetic 
test results, but also family medical history.18 
Since GINA’s passage, states have begun to use this 
broader definition of genetic information. For example, California 
has moved from laws regulating “genetic characteristics” to laws 
regulating “genetic information.” Prior to GINA, the California 
legislature had enacted a number of laws regulating the use of 
genetic characteristics. California defined genetic characteristics as 
Any scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or 
combination or alteration thereof, [or inherited characteristic that 
may derive from the individual or family member], that is known to 
be a cause of a disease or disorder in a person or his or her offspring, 
or that is determined to be associated with a statistically increased 
 
 16 TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2702(2) (1997). 
 17 Sagit Ziskind, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: A New Look 
at an Old Problem, 35 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 163, 182-83 (2009). 
 18 Id. at 183. 
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risk of development of a disease or disorder, and that is presently not 
associated with any symptoms of any disease or disorder.19  
The definition did not explicitly include family medical 
history or use of genetic services. After GINA’s passage, 
California enacted a law, termed Cal-GINA, which incorporated 
GINA’s more expansive definition of genetic information.20 This 
example illustrates what is likely to be a growing trend among 
states to expand the definition of genetic information to 
incorporate family medical history. 
The definition of genetic information is varied, 
especially at the state level. Sometimes there is variation even 
within a state depending on which section of the code is defining 
genetic information.21 Unless otherwise noted in this article, 
genetic information will refer to the broad definition of genetic 
information found in GINA that includes family medical history 
and use of genetic services. 
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATION: UNDERLYING LEGAL 
THEORIES FOR CURRENT STATE LEGISLATION 
A. Why Examine State and Not Federal Efforts 
A comprehensive federal bill governing individual 
genetic rights would be ideal in the United States—especially 
because family members who share genetic information often 
live across many different states. This article, however, focuses 
on the state level for a number of reasons. First, given the 
current political landscape, it is unlikely that Congress will pass 
broad-based genetic rights legislation in the near future. After 
passing healthcare reform—formally the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act—in 2010, Congress has become increasingly 
polarized surrounding healthcare policy.22 Beyond healthcare, 
 
 19 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(i)(2) (West 2013). 
 20 S.B. 559 (Padilla), 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
 21 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1379 (2009) (definition of genetic 
information in health insurance to include information about genes, test results, and 
family histories) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 20-448 (2009) (definition of genetic 
condition as a specific chromosomal or single-gene condition in life and disability 
insurances); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292 (McKinney 2012) (definition of genetics in employment 
that requires the gene alteration to be specifically linked to a disease or condition) and N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 2012) (definition of genetics limited to genetic testing in 
insurance). 
 22 For example, the House of Representatives has voted to repeal healthcare 
reform at least 30 times since its passage. See Tamara Keith, GOP To Make 31st 
Attempt To Repeal Obamacare Act, NPR (July 09, 2012), transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/09/156474493/gop-to-make-31st-attempt-to-repeal-
obamacare-act. 
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Congress’s bill-passage rate has been at an all-time low.23 
Given this climate, it is unlikely that Congress will act in the 
near future to pass the overarching comprehensive legislation 
that is needed to protect individuals in this arena. 
In contrast, states have increasingly begun to pass 
broad genetic rights legislation.24 In the future, there will likely 
be continued legislative efforts across other states to fill the 
gaps in genetic rights. Additionally, state legislatures will likely 
look to existing laws of other states as a model for their 
legislation. For this reason, it is essential to carefully examine 
state efforts to date and make suggestions for future state efforts. 
Finally, if and when the federal government does 
address broad genetic rights, it may look to state legislation for 
inspiration. “[A] ‘single courageous State’ [can] serve as a 
laboratory for experiments that might lead to advances for 
society as a whole.”25 State action in this area can be a catalyst 
to prompt Congress to act. If enough states adopt 
comprehensive genetic legislation, it could be a tipping point 
that compels the federal government to adopt similarly 
comprehensive legislation. Therefore, providing guidance for 
current state legislatures acting in this field is beneficial for 
society and individual genetic rights overall. 
B. Harms to be Avoided 
State legislatures must address four harms to create an 
appropriately tailored comprehensive genetic framework. First, 
individuals are often worried about negative consequences that 
stem from bad actors having access to genetic information—
they are scared of genetic discrimination. As mentioned, GINA 
has vastly improved protections against discrimination in the 
employment and health insurance context, but has left gaps in 
the system for other areas such as life, long-term care, and 
disability insurance; housing; and education. Second, there is 
concern over possible surreptitious testing of genetic material. 
For example, in a political race, a candidate’s genetic 
 
 23 Jonathan Strong & Humberto Sanchez, Congress on Pace to Be Least 
Productive, ROLL CALL (Sept. 13, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/features/Guide-
to-Congress_2012/guide/Congress-On-Pace-to-Be-Least-Productive-217538-1.html. 
 24 Jeeg, Groundswell for Genetic Privacy Building in States, COUNCIL FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GENETICS (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:07 PM), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
blog/post/groundswell-for-genetic-privacy-building-in-states.aspx; Vorhaus, supra note 5. 
 25 Sande L. Buhai, In the Meantime: State Protection of Disability Civil 
Rights, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 (2004) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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information could be secretly tested and used against that 
person to show that he or she would not be fit for the office.26 
While some state laws prohibit this testing, many do not.27 
Third, individuals are concerned with the unwanted disclosure 
of their genetic information. This can stem from fear of 
discrimination and frustrations with lack of control over 
research, but there is also an inherent concern in wanting to 
keep genetic information private. Finally, due to the uniquely 
personal nature of genetic information, there is some desire to 
not have the information used for certain purposes, such as 
research that an individual does not agree with. 
Current state models tend to focus on either a property or 
privacy model to address individual concerns about genetic 
information. The next sections will introduce the underlying legal 
theories of the property and privacy models as well as introduce 
implications of genetic information to the self, family, and society. 
Understanding these bases will help with analysis of whether 
these frameworks are addressing the harms to be avoided. 
C. Current Models of Genetic Rights 
Property law grants positive ownership rights over an 
item, which are firmly “enshrined in the United States 
Constitution”28 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.29 
Property rights are traditionally understood to encompass a 
bundle of rights, which, in this case, includes the ability for 
individuals to regulate the possession and transfer of their 
genetic information.30 Additionally, property provides litigants 
with a definitive cause of action for the taking of the 
information. Therefore, states that grant a property right to 
 
 26 Robert C. Green & George J. Annas, The Genetic Privacy of Presidential 
Candidates, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2192, 2192-93 (2008). 
 27 See Genetics & Pub. Pol’y Ctr., State Laws Pertaining to Surreptitious DNA 
Testing, (2009), available at www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State_law_summaries_final_all_
states.pdf (finding that 21 states and the District of Columbia do not have laws prohibiting 
surreptitious testing); see also, Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of 
Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 686 n.16, 687 (2011) 
(citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 2010) (prohibiting analysis or disclosure of results); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (prohibiting testing without prior consent); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
111, § 70G(c) (2008) (prohibiting health related entities from analyzing or disclosing results); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2 (2012) (prohibiting analysis and disclosure); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 79-l(2)-(3) (McKinney 2012) (prohibiting testing and disclosure)). 
 28 Weeden, supra note 10, at 650-51. 
 29 Leigh M. Harlan, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to 
Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 180-81 (2004). 
 30 See Mary J. Hildebrand & Jacqueline Klosek, Towards a Unified Approach on 
Protection of Genetic Information, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/
law-library/towards-a-unified-approach-on-protection-of-genetic-information.html. 
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genetic information enable their citizens to protect against the 
taking or misuse of genetic information.31 
While theoretical underpinnings of property rights 
began in the physical realm, over time, the model has been 
expanded to include intangible concepts and ideas through 
advances in patent and copyright law. Its use in regulating 
nontangible data can be tricky in the area of medical records. 
Even without adding a layer of genetic information, there is not 
a clear ownership right over patient medical data.32 For the 
most part, physical medical records are the property of the 
health care provider, but the data inside is not; this is similar 
to owning a book, but not owning the ideas contained inside.33 
Thus, if property rights attach to genetic information the model 
may look more like copyright law, rather than pure physical 
ownership law. As with copyright law in books and music, 
there are many more violations of property rights in these 
realms of easily transferable data, than when physical 
ownership is at issue.34 Therefore, property law has many of 
the tools available to regulate ownership in genetic 
information, although enforcement may potentially be at issue. 
While property theory encompasses positive rights, 
privacy theory imposes negative rights upon others. Privacy 
interests developed separately from property interests, and 
were intended to protect an individual’s control over personal 
information and decision-making. Privacy theory emerged from 
both common and constitutional law, and the constitutional 
roots of privacy have been applied to medical data over time.35 
The Supreme Court, for example, has held that a privacy 
interest in medical information does implicate the constitutional 
right to privacy, to the extent that there is one.36 Additionally, 
some states have recognized a constitutional right to privacy in 
their own state constitutions.37 
 
 31 Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy 
Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 226 (1996); Weeden, supra 
note 10, at 617. 
 32 Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 
AM. J. L. & MED. 586, 587 (2010). 
 33 Id. at 588. 
 34 See, e.g., STEPHEN E. SIWEK, THE INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE 
COST OF SOUND RECORDING PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (2007), available at 
http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf. 
 35 Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper 
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 762-67 (2004). 
 36 Id. at 766. 
 37 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1. 
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Protecting an individual’s control over personal 
information is an essential part of privacy theory.38 Many argue 
that the privacy model best serves to protect this interest in 
control specifically with regard to genetic information.39 “Our 
genetic information is unique to us and therefore can identify us. 
It has a familial component, revealing links with relatives and 
something about our reproductive risks. Genetic information is 
therefore deeply connected to us.”40 Thus, by protecting an 
individual’s control of personal information and decisions, a 
privacy model helps to protect the sanctity of the self. 
D. Balancing Competing Interests: The Benefits and 
Detriments of Various Models on the Individual, Family, 
and Society 
Defining a personal interest in genetic information—
whether as a property right or a privacy right—can have lasting 
effects on many groups. Genetic information is simultaneously 
individual, familial, and societal information. Therefore, it is 
important to consider how a privacy or property interest would 
affect each of these levels. 
1. Implications for the Self 
An individual’s interest in the control over, and 
confidentiality of, genetic information is grounded in protecting 
the self-identity of a person. Control of genetic information goes 
beyond merely protecting the secrecy of the information. It 
extends to give an individual control over the manner in which 
others use this information, whether others can learn this 
information about them, and how others can interfere in 
personal decisions.41 Personal control over genetic information 
can allow an individual to preserve his or her self-identity, 
while avoiding stigmatization and discrimination. 
Because genetic information is inherently entwined 
with an individual’s concept of self, many commentators have 
noted that recognizing a property interest in parts of the body 
 
 38 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324-25 (1967); Charles Fried, 
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-83 (1968). 
 39 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 35, at 739-40. 
 40 Id. at 739. 
 41 Id. at 739-40. 
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falls at odds with morality.42 Therefore, they argue that privacy 
rights are preferred over property interests because such rights 
allow control over information without commodifying body 
parts and “disaggregat[ing] the parts from the self.”43 Under a 
property model, genetic information is a commodity rather than 
something in which we have a personal interest. While property 
interests connote a certain control over genetic information, they 
also can have a negative effect. Privacy, on the other hand, does 
not treat the person as its “constituent parts,” but rather 
“understands it holistically,” which better protects our integrity.44 
Courts that have addressed property rights in an 
individual’s body parts have expressed “distaste for the 
possibility of treating human body parts as a form of 
property.”45 The legal system does not promote commodification 
of body parts. For example, it is illegal to buy or sell organs, 
which instead must be donated. Some argue that bestowing 
these property rights on individuals will turn bodies into 
commodities,46 allowing exploitation of the needy, who will sell 
their cells even when it may harm their health.47 However, 
criticisms against the commodification of body parts are mostly 
limited to physical tissue samples and organs, not personal 
data. Some have argued that the worry over commodification of 
the self is inapposite when only genetic information, not 
physical material, is at issue.48 But the concerns of 
disaggregating the self into pieces, rather than the whole, can 
still come into play when information about the self is 
introduced. As Professor Jessica Roberts has written, 
Allocating jobs, educations, or other social goods and privileges based 
on genetic traits fails to acknowledge that, while genetic information 
might reveal some aspects of a person’s identity—such as elements 
of her appearance, her health risks, or even her talents and 
 
 42 See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for 
Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their 
Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 277 (2004). 
 43 Suter, supra note 35, at 737. 
 44 Id. at 763. 
 45 See Robin Feldman, Whose Body is it Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange 
Effects of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2011). 
 46 See, e.g., Suter, supra note 35, at 746-47. 
 47 See Feldman, supra note 45, at 1384; Hildebrand & Klosek, supra note 30. 
 48 See Comparative Law—Genetic Privacy—Icelandic Supreme Court Holds 
that Inclusion of An Individual’s Genetic Information in a National Database Infringes 
on the Privacy Interests of His Child.—Guðmundsdóttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003 (Nov. 
27, 2003), 118 HARV. L. REV. 810, 815-16 (2004) [hereinafter Comparative Law]. 
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tendencies—it is incapable of capturing the essence of that person in 
her entirety.49  
Proponents of maintaining privacy rights, therefore, argue that 
privacy law is more suitable because it recognizes the “integrity 
and continuity of the self,”50 and is specifically made to protect 
individuals and their identities.51 
Use of an individual’s genetic information also has 
moral implications where the use of the information can 
undermine the specific values and beliefs of the individual.52 
“For instance, individuals may oppose research on the genetics 
of certain behavioral or other traits, like intelligence or sexual 
orientation.”53 In addition, some people may believe that 
genetic information should not be patented. Without personal 
rights over their genetic information, they lack any control over 
what their DNA is used for, which can conflict with their 
beliefs.54 This right to decide what one’s body and its parts are 
used for is a fundamental right that therefore deserves the 
utmost protection—protection that goes beyond monetary 
compensation and requires informed consent from the individual. 
This informed consent plays a vital role in protecting individual 
interests in genetic information and respecting human dignity.55 
Genetic information often implicates a person’s sense of 
personal identity. A privacy model, which stops others from 
accessing this information, may help an individual maintain 
his or her sense of self. Individuals may lose their sense of 
security or autonomy if others in society can access information 
that is so complexly entwined with personal identity. 
2. Effect on the Family 
Beyond self, genetic information is unique in its ability 
to provide enlightening information about an individual’s 
family.56 There is an increasing movement to expand the 
definition of genetic information from individual genetic test 
 
 49 Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an 
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 612 (2011). 
 50 See Suter, supra note 35, at 763. 
 51 See id.  
 52 Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing 
Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
119, 125 (2009). 
 53 Id. at 125-26. 
 54 Id. at 126. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Comparative Law, supra note 48, at 810. 
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results to include family medical history and the genetic test 
results of a family member.57 Under the expanded definition, a 
mother’s genetic information is also her children’s genetic 
information. But assigning personal control of genetic information 
can create complications for family members who may want 
access to that information or to ban its dissemination.58 As society 
embraces the inclusion of family medical history in genetic 
information, and states change their legal definitions of the 
term, regulation over control of genetic information must take 
family member rights into account. 
Assigning a property interest in genetic data may create 
a complicated realm of dual ownership of certain medical 
information. Property law envisages the possibility of joint 
ownership in goods, real estate, copyright, and other realms of 
possession. For example, easements or licenses provide certain 
individuals with the right to use another’s private property.59 
Thus, some analysts argue that a property framework is an 
effective model for handling joint genetic information.60 But joint 
ownership may create difficulties for family members. For 
example, if there is a dispute about what to do with a jointly 
owned piece of property, such as a house, the common legal 
recourse is to sell the property and then split the profits among all 
the joint owners. This, of course, is not a practical framework for 
genetic information. Ownership in genetic data can more 
appropriately be analogized to joint licensing under copyright 
law. However, this is not an ideal framework for genetic 
information among family members either. Under joint 
authorship, for example, an author can often give license to 
third parties to use the work. 
This does not necessarily play out smoothly in a 
situation regarding genetic information. Imagine, for example, 
a politician with a family history of Alzheimer’s running for 
office. A newspaper columnist wants to write an exposé about 
the politician, but the Alzheimer’s information is only known 
within the family. Under joint ownership, a brother could sell 
his portion of the genetic information to the author for 
publication without permission from the politician. The 
politician would have no recourse, even though she is arguably 
the target for the information and deeply connected to the 
 
 57 See supra Part I.B. 
 58 Weeden, supra note 10, at 653. 
 59 Comparative Law, supra note 48 at 816. 
 60 Id. at 815 (discussing the multiple stakeholders involved in privacy 
interests of genetic information and the complexities that the law must address). 
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genetic information of her brother. Therefore, while a property 
model envisions joint ownership possibilities, it does not 
necessarily address all concerns of individuals because it does 
not protect the privacy of the data or who the data is given to. 
Other analysts have suggested that control of genetic 
information in the medical field should be seen as a “joint 
account model” rather than as an individualized notion.61 
Under this model, genetic information of one individual would 
be made available to all family members unless there are 
compelling reasons not to do so.62 While this may seem at odds 
with the individualized privacy rights model entrenched in the 
system, this concept is enshrined in the mainstay of United 
States health privacy law: the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act. Although it is a widely unacknowledged 
provision, the Preamble to the privacy rule of HIPAA notes that 
medical information can be disclosed without violating HIPAA, 
even for the treatment of another individual—not the individual 
whose medical information is being disclosed.63 The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services notes that this can 
be helpful when a family member is deceased and another 
family member could benefit from medical information for their 
own treatment.64 This exception within HIPAA could have huge 
implications in the field of genetic privacy and shows that the 
federal government already predicts a framework where the 
health privacy of an individual is not absolute when it comes to 
the familial unit. 
Courts have also grappled with joint privacy interests 
among family members. The cases have varied in addressing 
issues of privacy among individuals; however a joint right of 
privacy is not an absolutely foreign concept to United States 
courts. In Vescovo v. New Way Enters, a daughter sued for 
invasion of privacy because her mother had placed a lewd 
classified advertisement in the paper. The court held that this 
invaded the daughter’s right to privacy when men, in response 
to the ad, came to the house she and her mother shared.65 In 
 
 61 See Weeden, supra note 10, at 653, (citing Who Should Genetic Information 
Belong To?, HEALTH & MED. WK. (Aug. 9, 2004)). 
 62 See Weeden, supra note 10, at n.181. 
 63 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.500 (2000), available at  http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre02.htm. 
 64 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Health Information Privacy: 
Frequently Asked Questions (2006), www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/right_to_access_
medical_records/222.html. 
 65 Vescovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd., 130 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Ct. App. 1976); 
see also Comparative Law, supra note 48, at 815-16. 
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other circumstances, however, United States courts have 
generally not “impose[d] a duty of confidentiality [in] 
interpersonal relationships.”66 
In the context of genetics, there has been some 
movement by courts to require healthcare professionals to 
disclose medical information in the context of hereditary 
disease. For example, in Safer v. The Estate of Pack, a father 
was treated by a doctor for colon polyps and eventually passed 
away due to colon cancer when the patient’s daughter, the 
plaintiff, was ten.67 Thirty-six years later, the daughter 
experienced abdominal pain and was eventually diagnosed with 
multiple polyposis. She sued her father’s doctor for failure to 
warn her of the hereditary nature of the illness.68 The Superior 
Court of New Jersey held that a physician has a duty to warn a 
patient’s immediate family members who are at risk of 
avoidable harm from genetically transmissible conditions. This 
case shows that courts could move toward a model where 
certain third parties have a duty to warn and breach individual 
privacy rights where a disease has known hereditary causes. 
If we return to the example of the politician above, 
under a privacy rights model we see that there are difficulties 
as well. The newspaper columnist would have a harder time 
arguing that the brother got informed consent to disclose the 
information because it violates the politician’s privacy rights 
and its value is tied to the politician. Thus, a privacy model 
may better protect the interests of an individual and allow him 
or her to avoid stigmatization and exploitation. 
The line becomes more blurred in other circumstances. 
For example, imagine a situation where a doctor speaks to a 
local Boy Scout group, with permission and informed consent of 
a patient, about the patient’s family history of Alzheimer’s 
disease. The doctor’s talk is meant to teach the group about 
heredity diseases. But if the patient’s cousin is connected to the 
group, then the doctor has just shared the cousin’s information as 
well. This situation would also pose problems under a property 
rights model because the patient could give the doctor permission 
to use the data in the same manner as under a privacy model. 
 
 66 Trevor Woodage, Relative Futility: Limits to Genetic Privacy Protection 
Because of the Inability to Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Information by Relatives, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 682, 707 (2010) (comparing a court decision allowing publication of 
private details about a relationship to publication of genetic information). 
 67 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 68 Id. 
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3. Consequences for Society 
In the aggregate, genetic information also has 
implications for society as a whole. Researchers use the 
combined genetic information of many individuals to study the 
genetic mutations associated with certain diseases or traits. 
Without vital access to the genetic information of many 
individuals, researchers will not be able to properly compute 
trends and connections between proteins, DNA, and diseases. Due 
to this global benefit, some argue that genetic information should 
be owned by society as a whole.69 Proponents of this theory note 
that the public should have access to genetic information because 
public money funded the Human Genome Project that created 
value in genetic information in the first place.70 While it is very 
difficult to simultaneously balance privacy or property interests 
for both individuals and society as a whole,71 it is important to 
consider how genetic research would be implicated by having a 
personal property interest, a personal privacy interest, or an 
altogether different interest in genetic information. 
There is an overarching policy argument in genetic 
rights legislation regarding the need to encourage individual 
participation in genetic research. For example, Congress passed 
GINA to ease individual fear of genetic discrimination and 
therefore promote participation in genetic testing and research.72 
Similarly, property interests in genetic materials can incentivize 
patient participation because patients can bargain for 
pecuniary reimbursement.73 
Conversely, the current property rights regime may 
discourage individual participation in research because 
researchers are not required to consider a donor’s rights when 
using his or her cells.74 A substantial amount of tissue used in 
biotechnology research has been obtained without paying 
compensation, and even without informing the cell donors that 
their cells can potentially generate economic returns.75 
Furthermore, if individuals are given property rights in their 
 
 69 See Ilise L. Feitshans, Spider Silk Jeans or Spider Silk Genes? The Future 
of Genetic Testing in the Workplace, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2001). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See, e.g., David Resnick, GINA—A Big Step Toward Personalized Medicine, 
BOS. BUS. J. (Aug. 21, 2008, 6:04 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-
high-tech/2008/08/gina--a-big-step-toward-personalized-medicine.html?page=all. 
 73 Lin, supra note 10, at 229. 
 74 See Gitter, supra note 42, at 280. 
 75 See id. at 270-71 (citing Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 
86 VA. L. REV. 163, 182 (2000)). 
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cells, researchers may be hampered if they are required to follow 
the chain of title in each piece of genetic material they obtain 
and if they are fearful of liability for mistakes.76 
This potential negative effect on research may be 
overstated. Some authors argue that recognizing a property 
interest in an individual’s genetic materials may, in fact, have a 
positive effect on research by providing individuals with an 
incentive to donate information.77 Generally, when individuals 
are not compensated or are not given a small payment for a 
good that they provide, they will be less willing to provide that 
good, whether or not providing it places a high burden on them, 
or even any burden at all. 
Despite the argument that the possibility for monetary 
compensation will encourage participation in genetic research, 
this may not hold true for both genetic material and genetic 
information. Some have argued that while a property interest 
in physical genetic material can promote research, a property 
interest in genetic information that stems from this material 
can actually hinder research because researchers would not be 
able to fully utilize the information in public datasets.78 
Overall, both a privacy model and a property model 
could stymie essential public health research about the genetic 
links to disease. If research is hindered, this could slow the 
public health benefits of genomic advances. 
E. Effect on Enforcement and Front-End Protections 
Choosing either a property or a privacy model for 
protecting genetic information changes how an individual can 
enforce violations of those rights. Laws that merely establish a 
privacy right against the release of genetic information to 
employers and insurance companies arguably provide less 
protection than laws that give individuals a property right in 
their genetic information.79 In states that grant a privacy 
interest, people “have some rights in relation to the cells of 
their body . . . . [T]hose rights, however, generally are grounded 
in notions of the fiduciary duty that a doctor owes to a patient 
and are frequently centered on the doctor’s obligation to obtain 
 
 76 See id., at 280. 
 77 See Hildebrand & Klosek, supra note 30. 
 78 Rodwin, supra note 32. Note, however, that Rodwin is not speaking of 
individual ownership of their genetic information, but of private database ownership. 
 79 See Weeden, supra note 10, at 628. 
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informed consent.”80 Additionally, because property rights are 
grounded in the Constitution and privacy rights are grounded 
in common law torts, some argue that this puts privacy rights 
on “weak ground.”81 Unfortunately, an action against a 
physician for violation of his or her fiduciary duty may not be a 
sufficient deterrent for doctors to protect their patients’ cells 
and the genetic information contained within. 
These proponents argue that a property right is 
stronger because of its Constitutional basis and that patients 
therefore may be able to better enforce any potential violations. 
Property interests may be beneficial in cases like Moore v. U.C. 
Regents of the University of California, where a patient brought 
suit against his doctor to recover money the doctor earned 
using the patient’s genetic material, but did not share any 
profits with the patient.82 However, the privacy framework may 
be more adept at preventing some of the unwanted harms from 
the outset. In the case of genetic information, much of the 
concern stems from preventing the information from being 
released in the first place. Privacy is a stronger preventive 
framework, but is not as strong in enforcement. Once an 
individual’s genetic information has been leaked, compensation 
for a violation of privacy rights is likely insufficient, especially 
if the individual loses his or her job or is unable to obtain 
health insurance. Therefore, in order to best protect individual 
concerns, it is important to consider not only which framework 
is the strongest for enforcement, but also which framework is 
best for prevention. This is especially true because many 
individuals, unfortunately, do not have the resources to file a 
civil court case even if their rights were violated under either a 
property or privacy model.  
III. BUILDING THE FRAMEWORK: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE 
EFFORTS TO DATE 
A. Need for Broad Coverage 
While there has been some movement at the state level 
to legislate regarding rights to genetic information, most of 
these efforts have been narrowly focused. For the most part, 
 
 80 See Feldman, supra note 45, at 1380. 
 81 Comparative Law, supra note 48, at 817. 
 82 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). In Moore, a doctor turned the cell line of a patient 
undergoing treatment for hairy cell leukemia into a commercialized line—without the 
patient receiving monetary benefit. Id. 
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states have genetic privacy legislation related to health 
insurance and employment—just as GINA only covers these 
realms at the federal level. These laws, therefore, leave a gap 
for entities outside of the health insurance and employment 
arena that might be interested in obtaining an individual’s 
genetic information.83 While health insurance and employment 
are certainly important areas, genetic progress implicates 
broader concerns such as education, banks, government 
entities, biobanks, restaurants, and more.84 For example, in 
2012 a student at Jordan Middle School in Palo Alto, California 
was required to transfer schools because he had the genetic 
mutation for cystic fibrosis.85 The student was not diagnosed with 
the disease, but given his genetic make-up, the school felt that he 
may be a health risk to two other students who were diagnosed 
with cystic fibrosis.86 Although he was allowed to return to school 
after an appeal by his parents, this example shows the potential 
for use of genetic information in realms outside of insurance and 
employment. To date, however, most states have limited genetic 
information legislation to only those two arenas. Forty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia have genetic information 
legislation that pertains to employment or insurances only, while 
three states—North Dakota, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania—
have no regulations at all.87 
Nineteen states have genetic information statutes that 
are broader than just health insurance and employment and 
extend to cover life, long-term care, or disability insurances.88 
Two states have limited scope statutes regulating areas beyond 
only employment and insurance. Arkansas, for example, has the 
Genetic Research Studies Nondisclosure Act, which prohibits 
disclosure of tissue samples in genetics research only if the 
samples have been made anonymous or if that patient has given 
informed consent.89 This law does not explicitly address whether 
the data that stems from the tissue or blood samples are similarly 
 
 83 Ram, supra note 52, at 122; Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Genetic Information 
and Third Party Access to Information: New Jersey’s Pioneering Legislation As a Model for 
Federal Privacy Protection of Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (1998). 
 84 Roberts, supra note 49, at 648.  
 85 Colman Chadam, California Boy Ordered to Transfer Schools for Carrying 
Cystic Fibrosis Gene, Goes Back to Class, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:58 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/08/colman-chadam-california-_n_2092816.html. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See infra Appendix, Table 1.  
 88 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 89 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-35-103 (2001); Note Arkansas is not included in the 
table as a state with regulation since only the physical specimen, not the DNA or 
information is regulated, see infra Appendix, Table 1. 
2013] PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION 195 
 
protected. Similarly, Texas state law covers employment and 
insurance, but also forbids genetic discrimination in licensing.90 
Several states, however, have broad reaching statutes 
regarding genetic rights. The next section will examine these 
statutes and examine which choose a property interest and 
which opt for a privacy interest. 
B. Broad Coverage through a Property Interest 
Five states—Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and 
Florida—have passed legislation that provides individuals with 
a property interest in their genetic information, although other 
states have proposed legislation in this area.91 Overall, the 
legislation among these states follows similar patterns. First, 
these statutes tend to cover genetic materials or limited genetic 
information. If they cover genetic information at all, it is the 
information that derives specifically from a genetic test, not 
broad genetic information such as family history.92 Therefore, 
most of these states do not raise questions of joint ownership of 
genetic information, assuming they are read narrowly to only 
pertain to the genetic test results of the individual being tested. 
Second, these statutes provide exemptions for specific areas of 
genetic information collection. 
In Alaska, “a DNA sample and the results of a DNA 
analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of 
the person sampled or analyzed.”93 The law requires written, 
informed consent for the collection, analysis, retention, or 
disclosure of information, with exceptions for law enforcement 
biobanks, paternity, newborn screenings, and emergency 
medical treatment.94 
Colorado’s provisions are quite sweeping and declare that 
“genetic information is the unique property of the individual to 
whom the information pertains,” although there are exceptions to 
the confidentiality requirements of the information for use in law 
enforcement, research (if the information is anonymous), 
paternity suits, and public health.95 
 
 90 TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 58.051 (West 2003). 
 91 See, e.g., Jennifer K. Wagner & Dan Vorhaus, On Genetic Rights and 
States: A Look at South Dakota and Around the U.S., GENOMICS L. REP. (Mar. 20, 
2012), www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2012/03/20/on-genetic-rights-and-states-
a-look-at-south-dakota-and-around-the-u-s/; See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 92 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1) (2010). 
 93 ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a) (2004). 
 94 Id. 
 95 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a). 
196 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
Georgia’s law also uses Colorado’s “unique property” 
language, with exceptions for law enforcement and anonymous 
research.96 The law is housed in the insurance section of the 
Georgia code and certain insurances, such as life, disability, 
and Medicare supplemental plans, are exempt from the genetic 
testing chapter.97 Therefore, it is unlikely that Georgia’s law 
would apply outside the insurance context as a result of the 
law’s location in the code. 
Louisiana’s legislation in this area is also housed under 
the insurance code and states that “[a]n insured’s or enrollee’s 
genetic information is the property of the insured or enrollee.”98 
Under the law, authorization is required for anyone else to 
retain genetic information, unless it is for a criminal 
investigation or to determine paternity.99 The statute defines 
genetic information broadly to include genetic test results of 
both the individual and family members, as well as manifested 
diseases of family members.100 Due to the sweeping definition of 
genetic information under Louisiana law, this is one state where 
seemingly innocuous and routine events could violate the law. For 
example, the legislation states that “no person shall retain an 
insured’s or enrollee’s genetic information without first obtaining 
authorization from the insured, enrollee, or their representative” 
and person is defined to “include a family, corporation, partnership, 
association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision 
or agency, and any other legal or commercial entity.”101 Under the 
broadest reading of this, a healthcare professional could not store 
information about a mother in her medical records without getting 
authorization from her children and other family members or 
without violating the family member’s property interest. This 
expansive reading is unlikely given that the rules are contained 
in the insurance code and speak directly to the genetic 
information of the insured or enrollee. Thus, although “person” 
is defined very broadly, Louisiana’s law most likely is much 
narrower and only covers the insurance context. As a result, 
the strong and important property rights regarding individuals’ 
genetic information in Louisiana are not as powerful as needed 
because genetic rights implicate other areas beyond insurance. 
 
 96 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2009). 
 97 Id. § 33-54-7. 
 98 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(E) (2011). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. § 22:1023 (A)(8) 
 101 Id. §§ 22:1023 (A)(13), (E). 
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The legislation passed in Florida states that “results of 
such DNA analysis . . . are the exclusive property of the person 
tested” and must remain confidential without the consent of 
the person tested except in the case of law enforcement 
biobanks and paternity testing.102 Florida’s law is the only one 
of the five statutes that has been specifically tested in a court, 
although the ruling is limited as it was not in the highest court 
in the state. In Doe v. Suntrust Bank, a plaintiff brought suit to 
determine the identity of a deceased man’s children in order to 
properly distribute the man’s trust among his descendants.103 
Doe, the decedent, had two known children, and two alleged 
children. The trial court ordered the known children of Doe to 
submit to DNA testing to assist in the determination of the 
putative children’s parentage.104 The legitimate children relied 
upon Florida’s code to argue that they could not be compelled to 
provide genetic data to the court without informed consent.105 
There is an exception in the Florida statute for paternity, but 
this exception only applies to the testing of “the child, mother, 
and alleged fathers,” not to alleged siblings.106 In its opinion on 
the motion to quash decision, the Second District Court of 
Appeal of Florida held that 
the primary purpose of the statute is to protect individuals who 
undergo DNA analysis by requiring informed consent before the 
analysis is performed, by providing confidentiality for the results, 
including exempting the results from disclosure as a public record, 
by providing control over how the results are disclosed, and by 
requiring notification that the analysis was performed and how it 
was used.107 
Nevertheless, the court also noted that the exceptions listed in 
the statute are not the only times that a court can order an 
individual to submit to a genetic test.108 
The dissent in Suntrust argues that the court’s opinion 
devalues the privacy interest in one’s DNA composition and 
undermines the legislative intent in § 760.40. “The majority, 
under the guise of discovery rules, would allow circuit courts to 
order DNA testing if the testing is arguably relevant to the 
pending matter, thereby ignoring the legislative determination 
 
 102 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2009). 
 103 Doe v. Suntrust Bank, 32 So. 3d 133, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), appeal 
denied, 46 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2010). 
 104 Id. at 135. 
 105 Id. at 137. 
 106 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.12(1) (West 2001). 
 107 Suntrust, 32 So. 3d at 138. 
 108 Id. 
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protecting an individual’s privacy rights to his or her own 
DNA.”109 This difference between the majority and dissenting 
opinions illustrates not just the difficulty of writing 
comprehensive legislation surrounding genetic rights, but also the 
difficulties in court enforcement. 
Although Suntrust raises questions about whether DNA 
testing falls within one of the exceptions to genetic testing, it did 
not specifically address the children’s property right in the genetic 
information. Thus, across all states with a genetic property model, 
this right remains untested in the courts. 
C. Broad Coverage through a Privacy Interest 
There is more variation among states that focus upon a 
privacy interest than those that focus on a property model.110 
As mentioned above, one reason for this is that some of the 
privacy laws tend to be narrow and focus only on employment 
and insurance,111 but even among broader state laws, there is 
greater variation. Ten states have generally broad privacy-
based laws regarding individual rights to genetic information: 
New Jersey, Delaware, Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and South 
Dakota.112 These state laws cover broader privacy rights of 
individuals and tend to establish rules for the collection, 
retention, and disclosure of genetic information. These laws 
generally include informed consent provisions, although the 
nature of the informed consent is altered depending on the state. 
As with the property states, these states also incorporate areas of 
exceptions into the law. 
New Jersey’s law—the Genetic Privacy Act—had one of 
the most interesting journeys through the legislative process. 
The bill, as originally passed by the state legislature, created a 
property right in genetic information; however Governor 
Whitman vetoed the bill because “the creation of a new 
statutory property right could lead to a proliferation of 
litigation in New Jersey—litigation that could have a chilling 
 
 109 Id. at 143. 
 110 In the analysis of state laws, statutes that applied to limited 
circumstances, such as in the family code for paternity testing, or to employment or 
insurance only were not included. This section focuses on some of the states whose 
statutes may have broader implications. 
 111 See supra Part III.A. 
 112 See infra Appendix, Table 1; Nebraska is discussed below, but is not 
included in the total count because the provision is limited to physicians and therefore 
does not count as comprehensive. 
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effect on scientific research.”113 The final bill signed into law 
was narrower, but is still considered one of the earliest broad 
genetic information laws to be passed.114 Under the codified 
Genetic Privacy Act, genetic information cannot be collected, 
retained, or disclosed without authorization from the individual, 
although there are exceptions for anonymous research and other 
categories.115 The law has been heralded as a model for other 
states, and most other state laws focusing on genetic privacy in 
broader categories have followed New Jersey’s example to 
regulate genetic information at multiple stages—collection, 
retention, and disclosure. 
Delaware prohibits, with some exceptions, obtaining 
genetic information from an individual without obtaining 
informed consent.116 Delaware’s definition of genetic information 
does not explicitly include family medical history, but it does not 
explicitly exclude that information either.117 Therefore, a broad 
reading of the law would require informed consent to gather 
family history; however, a strict reading of the law only requires 
informed consent when performing a genetic test. Delaware’s 
statute is also notable because it requires genetic samples to be 
destroyed promptly after use unless retention is necessary for 
criminal proceedings, authorized by court order, authorized by the 
individual, or anonymized for use in research.118 
Minnesota, Illinois, and Iowa are similar in that genetic 
information may only be collected, used, and stored in the 
manner for which an individual has given written informed 
consent.119 Additionally, in Minnesota, written informed consent 
regarding dissemination of genetic information is only valid for a 
maximum of one year, but a lesser period can be specified in the 
consent agreement.120 Therefore, after the period of informed 
consent had expired, healthcare professionals, researchers, and 
other actors would have to obtain informed consent again to 
disseminate genetic information to a third party. 
New Hampshire also requires written informed consent to 
perform a genetic test, except for a few limited situations, including 
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paternity, newborn testing, and criminal investigations.121 The 
information cannot be distributed to anybody not approved of in 
writing, although there is an exception for disclosure by a physician 
within the medical practice or hospital.122 
New Mexico, like New Hampshire, requires informed 
and written consent to obtain and retain genetic information, 
with exceptions for the original medical records of patients.123 
New Mexico’s law also has a provision similar to Delaware’s 
that genetic information must be destroyed upon request of the 
individual, with some exceptions.124 
New York law is similar with regard to the requirement 
for informed consent for collection, retention, and disclosure; 
however, there are some unique provisions under New York 
law.125 For example, one provision states that 
no person who lawfully possesses information derived from a genetic 
test on a biological sample from an individual shall incorporate such 
information into the records of a non-consenting individual who may 
be genetically related to the tested individual; nor shall any 
inferences be drawn, used, or communicated regarding the possible 
genetic status of the non-consenting individual.126  
However, this provision essentially terminates at death, 
because genetic testing may be performed on deceased 
individuals if informed consent is obtained from next-of-kin.127 
These provisions have immense implications for how family 
members can use their own genetic information—family 
medical history—in their personal healthcare. 
Oregon has a provision similar to New York when the 
genetic information of a deceased person is in question. Oregon 
law requires informed consent to obtain, retain, and disclose 
genetic information.128 There is, however, an exception to the 
rule for obtaining genetic information when it is “for the purpose 
of furnishing genetic information relating to a decedent for 
medical diagnosis of blood relatives of the decedent.”129 Unlike 
New York’s version of this provision, informed consent of the 
next-of-kin is not required in Oregon. 
 
 121 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2 (2012). 
 122 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H:2(III) (2008). 
 123 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-3(A) (West 1998). 
 124 Id. § 24-21-5(B). 
 125 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 2012). 
 126 Id. § 79-l (3)(b). 
 127 Id. § 79-l (11). 
 128 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(1) (West 2009). 
 129 Id. § 192.531(1)(f). 
2013] PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION 201 
 
Finally, South Dakota and Nebraska have requirements 
to obtain informed consent prior to genetic testing.130 Nebraska 
limits the requirement to physicians, but has an interesting 
provision whereby properly obtained informed consent is a bar 
on a civil suit against the physician for failure to inform.131 
Overall, the states that follow a privacy model focus on 
individual control of genetic information, specifically regarding 
collection, storage, and dissemination of genetic information. 
Most of these state laws apply broadly across populations, but 
each includes exceptions for various reasons. 
D. Common Exceptions to the Rule 
Across the states, exceptions to genetics rights 
legislation continue to emerge—both in a privacy and a 
property model. It is important to examine these exceptions to 
see why these areas should potentially fall under different 
rules. Each of these exceptions are covered in full articles 
themselves.132 This article argues that given the complexity of 
each of these areas, they should be exempted from this model 
state legislation. Given their unshakable implications for 
individual rights and privacy, states should address each of 
these in turn to truly establish comprehensive genetic rights for 
citizens. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to 
recommend model laws for these areas. Instead, this section 
gives a brief primer on the issues to highlight the complexities 
and illustrate why the exceptions exist. 
1. Newborn Screenings 
Most babies in hospitals are required to go through this 
common routine: “a small prick to the heel and a few drops of 
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(West 2007). 
 131 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-551(4). 
 132 See generally Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s 
Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767 (1999) (examining state 
practices for law enforcement DNA databanks and suggesting policy changes to protect 
genetic information); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (discussing the 
inability for information in databases to be completely anonymous and suggesting 
possible responses); Jaclyn S. D’Arminio, Note, “The Life of the Flesh Is in the Blood”: 
State Storage and Usage of Baby’s Blood Sample, 18 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 753 
(2012) (discussing the ethical, legal, and social implications of storing newborn 
screening samples); Dee O’Neil Andrews, Comment, DNA and Dads: Considerations for 
Louisiana in Using DNA Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 38 LOY. L. REV. 425 
(Summer 1992) (examining the use of DNA testing in paternity suits). 
202 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
blood collected on a piece of paper.”133 The tests done on this 
blood sample are part of one of the nationwide Newborn 
Screening (NBS) programs. Each state tests newborns for a 
number of genetic conditions and disorders.134 The number and 
type of tests vary among the states. One example of a common 
newborn screening measure is the test for phenylketonuria (PKU). 
This test checks whether a baby can process phenylalanine, an 
amino acid found naturally in many foods containing protein. If it 
cannot, the phenylalanine will build up in the body and can cause 
brain damage. If caught early, PKU can be treated through 
simple dietary changes.135 In this way, NBS programs help detect 
otherwise undiagnosed genetic disorders, but they also do much 
more. In many cases, there is a likelihood that a baby’s blood 
sample, called a bloodspot, will sit in a biobank where scientific 
researchers may be granted access to these samples.136 
One of the salient problems with NBS programs is their 
lack of regulations. Most NBS programs do not have a 
formalized consent process; only Maryland, Wyoming, and the 
District of Columbia require informed consent from the 
parents.137 Most of the other states use an opt-out form of 
consent, which “assumes that unless the parents specifically ask 
for the bloodspot to be destroyed, they have consented to the 
continued storage and presumed use of those bloodspots in 
research studies approved by the state.”138 This can be 
problematic because parents, who would not have consented to 
storage of their child’s bloodspot, may not be aware that they 
need opt out. “The mandatory data collection under opt-out 
programs and potential use of newborn samples in later 
research implicate a myriad of legal and ethical issues, 
particularly for programs with no requirements for any 
parental education regarding the screening program.”139 
Some argue that states should have the burden of 
ensuring that parents have given the state consent to have 
 
 133 D’Arminio, supra note 132, at 753. 
 134 NAT’L NEWBORN SCREENING & GENETICS RES. CENT., NAT’L NEWBORN 
SCREENING STATUS REPORT (Jan. 6, 2013), available at http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu/
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their child’s information.140 States argue that consent is not 
required because NBS involves a public health issue, but when 
the state’s interest in identifying the disease no longer exists—
either because the child does not have a disease or because the 
child has been treated—the state’s only interest with the DNA is 
for research purposes.141 Opt-in programs can be beneficial 
because they respect parents’ and patients’ right to privacy and 
their choice in medical treatment and care, require physicians to 
educate their patients about the available options, and may result 
in greater research use of the samples currently available.142 
Statutory guidelines are necessary to safeguard the 
privacy rights of newborns. One possible consequence of not 
protecting newborns’ privacy and not requiring informed 
consent is that parents may opt out of screening their children. 
“This prevents their children from [receiving] the diagnosis and 
lifesaving treatment they may need, and the state’s public health 
interest is no longer being met.”143 Given the complications of 
balancing the privacy interests of newborns and families with 
the public interest in decreasing the number of children 
suffering or dying from genetic conditions such as PKU, this 
area should be addressed with specific legislation. 
2. Law Enforcement Biobanks 
Another common exception in genetics rights legislation 
relates to the question: to what extent should DNA sampling be 
used by law enforcement? Genetic analysis can be a powerful 
tool for law enforcement and criminal courts because DNA 
profiling serves as a more reliable form of identification than 
fingerprinting and matches individuals to hair, skin cells, or 
other cells containing DNA at the scene of a crime. As such, 
many law enforcement agencies at the state and federal levels 
have begun to collect DNA samples in biobanks. This allows 
investigators to cross check evidence from a wide variety of 
crimes with DNA samples within the biobank. Due to the 
ability for these biobanks to be such powerful tools for law 
enforcement, the laws governing DNA sampling in the criminal 
context has been rapidly expanding. For example, Virginia 
initially required only certain sex offenders and certain violent 
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felons to provide DNA samples for the state’s DNA biobank.144 But 
within a year, the law was expanded so that all newly-convicted 
felons must provide DNA samples for the state DNA biobank and 
that all felons in Virginia prisons must provide DNA samples 
upon their release.145 Other states that require DNA samples from 
all convicted felons, violent or non-violent, include Alabama, 
New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming.146 
Felons are not the only ones at risk of having their DNA 
samples collected. By simply being arrested, an individual may 
be required to provide his or her DNA sample. In California, 
individuals arrested on felony charges are required to provide a 
DNA sample for analysis and inclusion in a biobank.147 DNA 
databases not only reveal genetic information about the 
individual who has DNA on file, but also information about his 
or her close relatives.148 One of the most prominent examples of 
this is the case of the “Grim Sleeper” in California. In 2010, the 
police were able to arrest a man linked to 10 murders in the Los 
Angeles area—dating as far back as 1985—through a familial 
DNA search.149 This was possible because law enforcement 
officers had arrested the Grim Sleeper’s son and collected his 
DNA sample. Standard tests revealed that his DNA partially 
matched DNA evidence from the unsolved murders. The partial 
match indicated that a family member would be the culprit.150 
This example highlights one of the most controversial aspects 
of California’s—and other jurisdictions’—biobanking DNA 
collected from arrestees, not just convicted individuals. In this 
case, the young man may not have even committed the crime 
he was arrested for, but simply by being arrested he 
unwittingly gave the police evidence of his father’s crime. Some 
may argue that this also shows the benefit of the law 
enforcement biobanks because 10 unsolved murders were 
resolved and future murders were potentially thwarted. 
Nevertheless, policymakers should take the privacy concerns of 
arrestees and their family members into consideration because 
of these situations. 
 
 144 Hibbert, supra note 132, at 774. 
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At the federal level, law enforcement is allowed to 
collect DNA from arrestees without a warrant and place this 
information in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).151 If 
cleared of the crime, arrestees can seek expungement; however, 
the federal government is not required to grant such a 
request.152 This begs the question: why should individuals who 
were wrongly arrested have their DNA profile in the federal 
database, and why is it their responsibility to have the 
information removed? 
Some argue that DNA sampling is the next natural step 
to fingerprinting, but DNA sampling is very different from 
fingerprinting. Making DNA sampling a part of the same 
routine as fingerprinting is problematic. Courts have upheld 
arrestee DNA sampling because they reason that law 
enforcement has the right to be certain of the identity of the 
arrestee.153 But this reasoning “is undermined by the fact that 
there has [been no evidence] that an individual’s fingerprints 
can be altered,” whereas “DNA evidence can be successfully 
fabricated.”154 More importantly, fingerprinting is an ideal way 
to determine who a person is because fingerprints do not offer 
any other personal information.155 On the other hand, DNA 
samples contain all sorts of revealing information beyond that 
of the individual’s identity. Although some argue that the DNA 
that is collected for this purpose is only “junk” DNA and does 
not reveal medical information of individuals, this idea has 
been challenged.156 
Given the complexities of rules surrounding collection of 
genetic information for law enforcement purposes, it is 
important to address these concerns separately from a general 
genetics model. States must consider from whom DNA can be 
collected, how and for how long it should be stored, and what 
purposes the information in the biobanks can be used for. 
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3. Paternity 
Many states have excluded paternity testing from 
statutes regarding genetic testing.157 In fact, many of the family 
law statutes in states have specific rules over the usage of 
genetic testing in the context of paternity testing.158 The use of 
genetic testing to determine paternity is generally less 
controversial than its use in law enforcement biobanks and 
newborn screening—likely for two main reasons. First, 
scientific testing to determine paternity has been occurring since 
the 1930s, beginning with ABO blood type testing.159 Second, 
given the wide availability of direct-to-consumer paternity 
testing,160 a person can get tested for paternity without concerns 
about inappropriate storage and use of genetic material attached 
to his or her name. There are other public policy concerns with 
wide availability of direct-to-consumer genetic testing;161 however, 
the ability to send anonymous samples often eases concerns about 
privacy, thus making paternity testing less controversial. Despite 
the minimal controversy in this area, full comprehensive 
legislation of genetics rights needs to ensure that there is proper 
regulation of genetic information use in paternity testing that 
meets societal goals while maintaining privacy. 
4. Anonymous Data 
The final common exception in state statutes for 
individual genetic rights is for anonymous data. In an effort to 
protect individuals’ privacy, researchers have tried to 
“anonymize” data. Anonymization is a technique researchers 
use to protect the privacy of individuals in large databases by 
deleting or changing personal, identifying information.162 “Data 
may be anonymized by not collecting or completely removing 
identifiers, by aggregating data into groups and ranges and not 
reporting individuals’ identities, or by micro-aggregating the 
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data into pseudocases representative of the real population.”163 
However, some policy analysts argue that this is not a 
sufficient protection because it is not difficult to “reidentify” or 
“deanonymize” individuals. The copious amount of information 
contained within DNA makes identification possible.164 A 
second strategy is to keep research participant information 
confidential by keeping identifying information separate from 
other research data and assigning a meaningless code to the 
research data. There would remain a “key” that could link 
information back to the identity of the participant, but only 
certain researchers would have access to the key.165 
Neither method—anonymization nor confidentiality—
can completely guarantee privacy.166 Two of the most striking 
examples of this come from a recent study where researchers 
identified men in an anonymous gene registry based on publically 
available information,167 and a computer science professor 
identifying the “anonymous” medical records of the governor of 
Massachusetts through publically available information.168 
Additionally, even if individual anonymity is somewhat protected, 
biobank data can identify members of discrete populations.169 This 
can be extremely problematic when the collection of data deals 
with highly sensitive information, such as HIV infection, mental 
illness, or alcoholism.170 
Many states that have laws granting a privacy or 
property interest in genetic information specifically exempt 
anonymous data from the protections. But given the inability to 
make genetic information completely anonymous in research, 
states should not include anonymous data as an exception.171 
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Thus, genetic rights protections for genetic information should 
include both general genetic information and anonymized 
genetic information. The next section outlines the ideal model 
for this legislation. 
IV. DETERMINING THE IDEAL: ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF 
THE STATE MODEL 
A. Dangers of Statutes that are Overbroad 
Although a broad individual interest in genetic 
information is an important right—especially given the 
personal and familial nature of genetic information—many of 
the current laws end up being so broad as to be unworkable in 
some circumstances. There are two main concerns with 
overbroad laws in this area which may inhibit free speech and 
chill potential research. First, if not carefully written, 
legislation can unintentionally result in making certain 
common activities illegal. For example, states that have made 
disclosure of genetic test results illegal without written 
informed consent from the individual potentially make some 
journalism unlawful. In 2008, several news outlets published 
stories about actress Christina Applegate’s cancer diagnosis 
and her decision to get a double mastectomy given that she 
carries the BRCA-1 mutation and had a higher-risk of 
developing cancer again in the future.172 These news outlets 
would have violated multiple state laws assuming that they did 
not get informed consent from Ms. Applegate that met the legal 
requirements in each state—even though Ms. Applegate is 
open about her BRCA status and has started the Right Action 
for Women foundation, an organization that provides high-risk 
women with access to breast screenings.173 
As states begin to incorporate a broader definition of 
genetic information into their laws, the concern over disclosure 
of information, leading to the breadth of laws in this area, will 
be somewhat exacerbated. For example, in California, the 
Genetic Information Privacy Act has been introduced in the 
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state senate.174 This proposed legislation includes an expanded 
definition of genetic information and requires written informed 
consent to obtain, analyze, or disclose genetic information.175 
Thus, under this law, for example, writing about how President 
Obama’s mother had ovarian cancer could be a violation. At the 
broadest level, telling a coworker that a friend’s father has high 
blood pressure would be a violation of the law unless written 
informed consent was first obtained from the friend and his 
father. Therefore, under both examples of broad interpretations 
of the law, there may be violations that were not meant to be 
legislated by the states. Yet these laws still provide important 
and essential protections for individuals in a growing area of 
privacy: The solution would not be simply to not pass these 
laws, but to carefully word and tailor protections necessary to 
avoid these expansive violations. 
Second, there is a concern that overbroad laws will 
hinder scientific innovation and research. In both the property 
and privacy models, there is potential to obstruct important 
public health research if scientists have to follow a chain of 
title for genetic information or have to get informed consent for 
each new research protocol. Therefore, because genetic 
information in the aggregate can have immense societal and 
public health implications, it is important to strongly consider 
the implications on research when establishing the laws. 
B. Addressing the Concerns 
Current state law genetic information privacy and 
property models tend to be overbroad in their protections. 
Nevertheless, these frameworks often fail to address some issues 
related to family disclosure of genetic information, implicate 
additional concerns about commodification of the self, and 
hinder research participation.176 Therefore, a different model 
designed to address these additional concerns is necessary. 
As mentioned above, there are four main concerns for 
individuals in the realm of genetic rights: fear of 
discrimination, surreptitious genetic testing, unwanted 
disclosure of genetic information, and control over how 
personal information is used in research. 
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1. Fear of Discrimination: Need for Comprehensive 
Ban on Discrimination 
Fear of discrimination is a major concern for individuals 
seeking genetic testing. For many, the interest in genetic 
privacy stems from concerns that genetic test results will be 
misused.177 While GINA has expanded protections against 
genetic discrimination at the federal level, it only extends that 
protection in the context of employment and health insurance. 
Thus, individuals are not protected from discrimination at the 
federal level in other areas—most notably in the context of life, 
long-term care, and disability insurances.178 While the majority 
of literature has focused on gaps in federal law regarding life, 
long-term care, and disability insurances,179 there is also the 
potential for misuse of genetic information in other realms, 
such as education, licensing, mortgage lending, and public 
accommodations. Due to the broad range of areas in which 
genetic information can be inappropriately used, a 
comprehensive law protecting genetic information must include 
broad anti-discrimination protections. 
Additionally, these laws must completely ban the use of 
genetic information in these realms, rather than simply 
regulate the use of genetic testing. Currently, some states have 
laws that protect against the use of genetic information in life, 
long-term care, and disability insurance, but these laws 
generally regulate how genetic information is collected and 
used. For example, in Maryland, a long-term care insurer can 
only use genetic information in coverage or premium decisions 
if it is based on actuarial justification.180 This is a common state 
trend to ban only “unfair” discrimination that is not based on 
actuarial principles. This does not, however, provide sufficient 
protection for individuals who have genetic predispositions to 
certain conditions or chronic diseases because it can effectively 
bar them from getting access to these insurances—having a 
predisposition to a disease will likely have strong actuarial 
justification for increased premium rates or denials. Therefore, 
anti-discrimination laws must be expanded to ban the use of 
genetic information in a variety of areas at the state level. 
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California is one of the first states to provide strong, 
comprehensive protections against genetic discrimination in a 
broad range of arenas. In 2011, California passed “Cal-GINA,” 
which protects individuals against genetic discrimination in 
many of these areas.181 As Senator Padilla, the author of the 
bill noted, “SB 559 [(Cal-GINA)] will include genetic information 
as a prohibited basis for discrimination in the areas of housing, 
employment, education, public accommodations, health 
insurance coverage, life insurance coverage, mortgage lending, 
and elections.”182 Cal-GINA amends California’s civil rights 
statute, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, to make genetic 
information a protected class. Unruh is very broad and applies 
to “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”183 
Comprehensive legislation at the federal level or in other states 
must also be this broad in order to truly protect individuals 
from having their genetic information misused. 
2. Control of Genetic Material: Banning Surreptitious 
Testing 
Another concern for individuals seeking genetic testing 
revolves around unauthorized access to their genetic 
information. Due to the personal nature and potential misuse 
of genetic information, individuals often have a strong interest 
in keeping their genetic information private. Two major 
concerns stemming from this are fears that somebody may 
gather genetic information without an individual’s knowledge 
and concern about inappropriate disclosure of that information. 
These fears can be addressed with properly tailored legislation 
regarding surreptitious genetic testing and disclosure. As 
mentioned above, many of the current laws attempting to protect 
genetic privacy in this area are too broad.184 Therefore, the laws 
must be more narrowly tailored to avoid unintended 
consequences. This does not mean that the laws should lose their 
comprehensive protections—a properly tailored law can give 
broad protections without making innocuous behavior illegal. 
The first step toward narrowly tailoring genetic privacy 
legislation is to explicitly make surreptitious genetic testing 
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illegal. With the ever-increasing number of direct-to-consumer 
testing sites available, it is becoming much easier for somebody 
to collect another individual’s genetic material and send it to a 
lab for analysis.185 Testable genetic material can be pulled from 
strands of hair, discarded cups, or used cigarettes.186 This 
practice of surreptitiously testing another person’s DNA 
without their knowledge is not illegal in many states. In a recent 
survey, the Genetics and Public Policy Center found that only 10 
states restrict surreptitious collection for both health and non-
health related purposes.187 Other states regulate specific areas, 
such as health-related testing, paternity testing, and 
employment, but 21 states have no laws relating to 
surreptitious testing.188 Even among those states with laws 
regarding genetic testing without an individual’s knowledge, 
the laws may not provide strong enough protections to cover all 
circumstances.189 
Accordingly, a comprehensive model of genetic rights 
must prohibit intentionally taking or collecting an individual’s 
genetic material, without written informed consent, for the 
purpose of analyzing, disseminating, or disclosing genetic 
information. This portion of the model state law should 
explicitly deal with the collection of genetic material—not the 
collection of genetic information overall. As the definition of 
genetic information expands to include family medical history 
and use of genetic services, it is essential to clarify that this 
broad definition does not apply to the surreptitious testing 
portion of a model law. It is not practical to require written, 
informed consent each time somebody asks about a family 
member’s condition or about a test result. 
Commentators have suggested criminalizing 
surreptitious genetic testing.190 A prospective criminal law 
should have three elements. First, the law must be broad 
enough to encompass collection from discarded items, such as 
cigarette butts, as well as direct collection of DNA samples 
 
 185 Sara Katsanis & Gail Javitt, Surreptitious DNA Testing, GENETICS & 
PUBLIC POL’Y CENTER (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/issuebriefpdfs/
Surreptitious_testing_issue_brief.pdf. 
 186 Id. 
 187 State Laws Pertaining to Surreptitious DNA Testing, GENETICS & PUB. 
POL’Y CENTER (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State_law_
summaries_final_all_states.pdf. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Stalking and Voyeurism: A New Challenge 
to Privacy, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 539, 560-61 (2009). 
 190 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of 
Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 689 (2011). 
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through saliva, blood, or tissue. Therefore, the language of the 
law must be broad enough to include a ban on collecting 
discarded genetic material, as well as taking genetic material 
directly from a person. For example, New York state law bans 
genetic testing on a sample “taken” from an individual without 
informed consent.191 But this prohibition may not encompass all 
surreptitious testing because it may not apply to “abandoned” 
items.192 Second, if genetic material is collected from an 
individual, written, informed consent should be required. While 
some have argued that there should be exceptions for law 
enforcement and healthcare professionals, this article argues 
that there should only be an exception for law enforcement.193 
Especially given the concerns about research, discussed below, 
there are compelling reasons why patients should have to give 
written, informed consent when undergoing genetic testing in 
the healthcare setting.194 Finally, the law must only ban 
collection of genetic information if the collectors intend to 
analyze or disseminate the information. This helps to tailor the 
law so as not to make it overly broad.195 
In some circumstances, intent can be difficult to prove. 
While protective laws are important, not every person has 
equal access to the judicial system and not every violation of 
the law is easy or possible to prove. Therefore, state laws can 
add additional protections that will help to thwart 
surreptitious testing from occurring in the first place. For 
example, genetic testing facilities should be prohibited from 
extracting genetic information from anything other than a 
blood sample, buccal swab, saliva test, or other generally 
accepted laboratory practice.196 This regulation would prohibit 
testing to be done off of discarded samples, such as drinking 
glasses or cigarette butts—thus making surreptitious testing 
more difficult to complete. As in the case of a criminal law 
against surreptitious testing, there should be an exception for 
law enforcement purposes. However, this is one area where 
paternity testing should not be exempt from the state 
comprehensive law. Surreptitious testing for parentage 
determinations is one of the main areas of concern for policy 
 
 191 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 79-l(2)(a) (McKinney 2009). 
 192 See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 189, at 560-61. 
 193 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 190, at 691-92. 
 194 See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 195 See, e.g., Joh, supra note 190, at 690 (noting that intent is essential to 
avoid criminalizing the purchase of celebrity mementos that may have DNA on them 
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analysts in this arena.197 There is concern that women will test 
unknowing men to determine if they are the fathers of children, 
or men will take genetic material from children to determine 
whether they are their fathers. The rights of men and children 
to not be surreptitiously tested should remain intact. This is an 
area, however, where it may be appropriate to create an 
exception for court-ordered testing. 
3. Maintenance of Privacy: Avoiding Disclosure of 
Genetic Information 
A ban on surreptitious genetic testing alone will not 
provide adequate protection for the privacy rights of 
individuals. In addition to banning secret testing, states also 
need to legislate regarding disclosure of genetic information. 
The statute should prohibit disclosure of genetic information with 
the intent to harm the individual whose information was disclosed, 
or with the intent to give personal gain to the discloser. This 
requirement is especially important when genetic information 
includes not only test results, but an individual’s family history. A 
ban on surreptitious testing may help to avoid covert analysis of 
genetic material, but this does not preclude an individual from 
collecting and disclosing sensitive family history. Because family 
medical history has the potential to reveal information about an 
individual’s propensity to a disease, this information must be 
regulated in order to fully protect an individual. 
Legislating against disclosure of genetic information has 
a strong basis in common law and some state tort doctrines. 
For example, in many states, the common law right to privacy 
includes both the rights to be free from intrusion upon an 
individual’s seclusion or solitude, and from public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts.198 But common law itself does not 
provide sufficient enough protection in this area because it is 
not clear that courts will apply these principles to disclosure of 
genetic information.199 For purposes of comprehensive genetic 
rights legislation, the public disclosure of private facts should 
be banned. Further, the elements of this violation should be 
altered from the general common law definition in order to be 
effectively protective. 
 
 197 See, e.g., Katsanis & Javitt, supra note 185. 
 198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977); see also Rothstein, 
supra note 189 (discussing how states have adopted pieces of the restatement). 
 199 Rothstein, supra note 189, at 548-53. 
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First, at common law in many states, the disclosure of 
private facts must be embarrassing in nature.200 There are 
pieces of genetic information, however, that may be positive or 
neutral, but that an individual still maintains a desire to keep 
private.201 Additionally, due to the familial nature of genetic 
information, a neutral disclosure about one person may 
implicate family members. For example, if an individual tests 
negative for Huntington’s Disease, this is not “embarrassing” 
for the individual, but indicates that other family members did 
have the disease—hence the need to be tested. Therefore, 
legislation in this area should make clear that disclosure also 
means any private genetic information that the individual does 
not want disclosed—not only those that a reasonable person 
would find embarrassing. 
Second, under the tort of disclosure of private facts, the 
revelation must be given to the public. Therefore, a line must 
be drawn that clarifies what constitutes public disclosure. If an 
individual gossips to two other coworkers about the genetic 
information of their boss, does this rise to the level of public 
disclosure? If a public blog that only has 10 followers publishes 
the family history of a local political candidate, is this sufficient to 
count as public disclosure? Courts have varied in interpretations 
of how many people it takes to constitute public disclosure.202 In 
order to create the most comprehensive protections at the state 
level, legislatures should define public disclosure broadly to 
include giving information to a small number of individuals. 
Third, states must decide whether and how they will 
define the “newsworthy” or “noteworthy” exception to the 
public disclosure tort. Often, an individual is allowed to 
disclose private facts if it is of legitimate concern to the 
public.203 This means that it will be more difficult for a public 
figure to win under the disclosure law than a private 
individual. This exception is enshrined in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and may therefore be difficult to alter. It is 
important to note in the law—to the extent possible—where 
this line may be drawn. An exception for newsworthy or 
noteworthy disclosure may leave a gap in protection for public 
individuals whose genetic information is disclosed—such as a 
 
 200 Id. at 548. 
 201 Id. at 551-52. 
 202 See id. (discussing the court split between whether disclosure to a small 
number of coworkers rises to the level of public disclosure). 
 203 Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and 
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candidate’s genetic information.204 Nonetheless, this model 
framework fixes two current problems in the realm of public 
figures. First, because it bans surreptitious testing, it makes it 
more difficult to legally gather information from the outset. 
Second, this law corrects the concerns about criminalizing some 
journalism about individuals such as Christina Applegate by 
tailoring the anti-disclosure laws more narrowly. 
These broad changes in the tort elements should be 
coupled with an additional intent element. While intent can be 
difficult to prove in some circumstances, this addition creates 
an appropriate balance between allowing the free-flow of 
information in journalism, research, healthcare, and daily life, 
while protecting privacy interests of individuals. Therefore, the 
statutory ban on disclosure in a state comprehensive genetics 
bill should ban the disclosure of genetic information with the 
intent to harm the individual or family member or with the intent 
to obtain personal gain for the discloser. Including an intent 
requirement would avoid banning most daily conversations, but 
would make illegal the disclosure of genetic information to harm 
an individual, create sensational news, or give one individual’s 
private information simply to harm a family member. This ban on 
disclosure of all genetic information—including family history—
coupled with the ban on surreptitious testing can offer 
comprehensive privacy of genetic information without creating 
overbroad privacy or property rights. 
The addition of the intent requirement will make some 
public disclosure of private facts not actionable—even some 
disclosures that may be offensive or upsetting to the individual. 
For example, the Boy Scout example205 would most likely not be 
actionable under this model. Still, this solution creates a more 
desirable balance than the current state laws in this area that 
are overbroad and make illegal many innocuous conversations. 
Laws that protect every possible unwanted disclosure of 
genetic information will be overbroad and significantly hinder 
important daily activities, journalism, and research. The 
balance drawn between individual protection and efficiency is 
best when state laws ban surreptitious testing and 
simultaneously prohibit certain intentional disclosure of 
genetic information 
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4. Control over Research: Providing Meaningful 
Informed Consent through an “Advance Research 
Directive” 
The final area of concern for many individuals in 
genetics rights is research data. Many individuals have their 
genetic material and genetic information stored in biobanks 
where researchers can collect data for research projects. These 
individuals may not even be aware that their genetic 
information is stored. In other situations, individuals may have 
given permission for their tissue sample or information to be used 
for one type of research, but are unaware that their data has been 
stored for other research in the future. Many biobanks store data 
in a deidentified or anonymous manner; but, as discussed above, 
there is no such thing as truly “anonymous” data in this arena.206 
Due to the uniquely personal nature of genetic information, 
individuals may not want their information used for research that 
they find offensive.207 There are a variety of harms that can come 
from unwanted participation in genetic research, such as 
possible reidentification of “anonymous” data, objectionable 
uses, and harms to discrete groups.208 
Once an individual’s data is housed in a biobank, it is 
rare that a person will be contacted again to give informed 
consent for subsequent research. However, “information or 
material collected for one purpose may have tremendous value 
for additional purposes, particularly if analyzed by techniques 
not previously available.”209 Indeed, restricting the use of genetic 
material to single tests would be impractical and greatly hinder 
the benefits and ease of use of biobanks.210 In some cases, an 
individual has signed loose informed consent documents for the 
initial research that they enrolled in, but these documents do 
not adequately give information regarding subsequent research 
or the possibility of reidentification of anonymous data.211 In order 
to give individuals comprehensive rights to their genetic 
information, a state law must provide some amount of individual 
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control over research without hindering the research and public 
health benefits of population databases and biobanks. 
Giving an individual a meaningful informed consent 
opportunity when genetic information is first gathered for 
research is an essential step toward individual control. Note, 
however, that this will not solve the dilemma of how to regulate the 
large amount of genetic information already housed in biobanks 
across the country. In the past, scholars in this field have suggested 
mechanisms such as a newsletter or specialized review board to 
keep individuals informed of research, especially in cases of 
controversial research.212 These systems can help to ensure 
continued individual involvement in research, but this article will 
focus on informed consent at the initial collection point. 
Informed consent documents are difficult to create in a 
manner that will truly inform patients of future research and 
future uses,213 but, when properly conducted, informed consent 
ensures that individuals understand their rights regarding their 
genetic information. Studies have found that individuals 
generally view societal benefits as a positive reason to enroll in 
research and discrimination or abuse of information as 
deterrents.214 Thus, effective informed consent may encourage 
further participation in research. However, meaningful informed 
consent is difficult to give in this arena. 
If the creation of these database resources is to be practicable, the 
materials and information will need to be available to investigate 
many diseases and many target genes. But that kind of broad 
availability will make it impossible for researchers to give the kind 
of full information about the potential risks and benefits of specific 
research that existing law seems to require for informed consent.215 
Therefore, states may need to alter the way in which informed 
consent is provided for research to ensure a balance between 
individual protection and research benefits. 
Most importantly, informed consent needs to include 
information, not just about risks and benefits of current 
research, but also about potential future research. Laws 
regarding informed consent should apply to both research and 
clinical settings—both arenas may lead to future research 
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2013] PROTECTION OF GENETIC INFORMATION 219 
 
using initial sample collection.216 In a 1999 report, the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) recommended that 
informed consent for research should be obtained separately from 
informed consent for clinical procedures.217 This article does not 
contradict that recommendation, as the recommendation speaks 
to when informed consent should be gathered, not the fact that 
informed consent should be collected. Comprehensive state laws 
should require informed consent for all initial contexts in which 
an individual’s genetic material and information will be used 
for research—whether stemming from clinical care or from 
direct enrollment in research. 
It is impractical, for both individuals and researchers, to 
require new informed consent for every subsequent research 
protocol performed with an individual’s genetic information.218 
But current informed consent forms do not adequately inform 
individuals of future research and potential risks and benefits 
of that research.219 Therefore, a balance in the middle of these 
extremes must be created. One option would be to allow 
individuals to complete an informed consent document that acts 
as an “advance healthcare directive” for the use of genetic 
material—an “advance research directive.” 
In most states, advance healthcare directives have 
multiple sections for an individual to fill out and make decisions 
about their health decisions in case of incapacity. For example, 
the California advance healthcare directive includes parts that 
relate to: (1) naming a “power of attorney for healthcare,” (2) 
establishing individual wishes for treatment, (3) delineating 
guidelines for organ donation, (4) designating a primary care 
physician, and (5) signing the form.220 Informed consent 
documentation should be established to follow a similar model. 
In particular, there should be five main sections of 
informed consent in an advance research directive: (1) 
delineating options for future research, (2) clarifying views on 
“anonymous” research, (3) listing family members, (4) designating 
a primary care physician, and (5) signing the form. 
 
 216 While newborn screening is often an exception to state laws in this area, 
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a. Options for Future Research 
The first section of informed consent should give 
individuals the space to delineate what type of research they 
consent to for future use of their genetic information. The 
NBAC suggested this concept in its 1999 report.221 For samples 
collected in the future, the NBAC recommended that “consent 
forms be developed to provide potential subjects with a 
sufficient number of options to help them understand clearly 
the nature of the decision they are about to make.”222 The 
report lists six sample options: 
[1] refusing use of their biological materials in research, 
[2] permitting only unidentified or unlinked use of their biological 
materials in research, 
[3] permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for 
one particular study only, with no further contact permitted to ask 
for permission to do further studies, 
[4] permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for 
one particular study only, with further contact permitted to ask for 
permission to do further studies, 
[5] permitting coded or identified use of their biological materials for 
any study relating to the condition for which the sample was 
originally collected, with further contact allowed to seek permission 
for other types of studies, or 
[6] permitting coded use of their biological materials for any kind of 
future study.223 
Another option would be to allow individuals to opt-in, or 
out, of research for a particular type of disease or condition. For 
example, an individual could state that his or her genetic 
information could be used for any research, except for research 
regarding Alzheimer’s disease. In that case, there would be the 
potential that an individual’s instructions do not clearly line up 
with research resulting in confusion for researchers as to whether 
consent was truly given. However, this potential lack of clarity 
also exists in the context of advance healthcare directives. No 
advanced method is truly perfect, but allowing for patient choice 
is important. Under this system researchers would at least have 
some guidance and individuals would have more control. 
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Additionally, this potential lack of clarity can be mitigated by 
providing some guidance to individuals. For example, some 
advance healthcare directives specifically give options for feeding 
tubes or palliative care, but also provide a free-form section for 
individuals to write more specific instructions. Similarly, 
informed consent for research could list common diseases, 
conditions, or behaviors that may be studied—especially 
controversial potential research areas such as behavioral genetics 
or the genetics of homosexuality—and also leave space for 
individuals to write in more specific instructions. 
Allowing individuals this control over their genetic 
information will make use of biobanks more difficult for 
researchers. The researchers must create a system to code for 
individual’s desires and only use the genetic information in each 
project of individuals who have consented to that type of research. 
This creates work to create such a system, and the possibility that 
fewer genetic samples will be available for studies. This is still 
preferable to those current state laws that have the potential to 
make research nearly impossible by requiring new informed 
consent documentation for each use of genetic information. Given 
the uniquely personal aspect of genetic information, this system 
creates a fair balance between individual control and research 
functionality. Additionally, researchers have begun to use models 
like these for returning research results to participants and 
therefore, may be able to be modified for use at the front end 
research participation. 
b. Anonymity 
As mentioned above, there is almost no way to make 
genetic data both useful and truly anonymous.224 Therefore, 
informed consent documents must explain this to individuals. 
The procedures for how patient information will be made as 
anonymous as possible should be delineated. In this section, 
individuals will sign that they understand the limitations of 
the anonymity of data. If they do not want research done where 
anonymity cannot be guaranteed, they should be able to note 
this in the first section above. 
 
 224 See supra Part III.D.4. 
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c. Family Members 
Due to the familial nature of genetic information, 
individuals should have the option of designating a family 
member or family members to contact in the event that there 
are research results that could be returned, but the individual 
is no longer accessible.225 This would be similar to appointing a 
power of attorney for healthcare decisions, but would appoint a 
family designee to obtain relevant research findings. 
d. Primary Care Physician 
Individuals should also have the opportunity to provide 
the name of a primary care physician from whom to receive 
research results. As more biobanks are determining how to 
best return research results to their subjects, some individuals 
may decide that they do not wish to hear this information 
directly from the researcher. In some circumstances, individuals 
may prefer to have their doctor share this information with 
them so that they have the opportunity to ask questions and to 
determine next steps for clinical care. Therefore, the advance 
research directive should include a space to provide contact 
information for a primary care physician. 
Other laws in the genetic arena have acknowledged the 
advantages of having a doctor, rather than another party, 
disseminate the information to the originator of genetic 
information. For example, in Minnesota, a life insurance 
company can notify an individual of genetic test results by 
releasing information to either the individual or their designated 
physician.226 “If the individual tested has not given written 
consent authorizing a physician to receive the test results, the 
individual must be urged, at the time that the individual is 
informed of the genetic test result described in this subdivision, 
to contact a genetic counselor or other health care 
professional.”227 New Jersey, New York, Maine, and Texas all 
have similar provisions in their codes.228 
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Allowing individuals to include a physician on their 
advance research directive may increase participation in research 
because it may help to alleviate individual fears regarding 
knowledge of predispositions. Speaking to a trusted physician 
about a test result, rather than receiving information through a 
researcher or computer print-out, may be more palatable to 
some individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
As the use of genetic testing rises, many states are 
beginning to pass legislation aimed at filling the gaps in GINA 
and providing comprehensive genetic rights to individuals. 
Comprehensive genetic rights are essential to encourage the use 
of testing, ensure participation in research, and strengthen 
individual rights in a deeply personal and familial realm. 
However, many state efforts to date provide overbroad property 
or privacy rights in genetic information and are not sufficiently 
tailored to create truly comprehensive rights. An article in the 
Genomics Law Report summarizes the trend in its review of a 
proposed South Dakota bill. 
In under 200 words, the South Dakota bill, if passed, would (1) grant 
property rights to individuals in their DNA samples and genetic 
information, (2) prohibit surreptitious testing, (3) call into question 
many forensic and law enforcement uses of DNA, (4) eliminate 
newborn blood spot screening without explicit consent and (5) impose 
broadly worded informed consent requirements on all collections and 
uses of individual genetic data.229 
Genetic rights are too complicated to fully protect with a 
law containing fewer than 200 words. The growing trend 
among states to make overbroad laws in this arena jeopardizes 
individual rights because it waters down the law, makes 
innocuous behavior illegal, and makes it harder to pass corrective 
legislation the second time around. 
In order to provide comprehensive genetic rights for 
individuals, states should make broad laws that are specifically 
tailored to address the four major concerns of individuals in the 
genetic arena—fear of discrimination, surreptitious genetic 
testing, unwanted disclosure of genetic information, and 
control over how personal information is used in research. To 
do this, states should expand anti-discrimination laws to ban 
the use of genetic information in all businesses and 
 
 229 Wagner & Vorhaus, supra note 91. 
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government practices, prohibit surreptitious genetic testing, 
forbid intentional disclosure of genetic test results for personal 
gain or to harm an individual or family member, and create 
meaningful informed consent in research by creating an 
advance research directive for individuals whose genetic 
information will be used in research. Only with tailored 
components of a broad genetic rights bill will individuals truly 
be given comprehensive rights over their genetic information. 
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APPENDIX  





















Alabamai X    
Alaskaii X  X  
Arizonaiii X X   
Arkansasiv X    
Californiav X X   
Coloradovi X X X  
Connecticutvii X    
Delawareviii X   X 
District of Columbiaix X    
Floridax X  X  
Georgiaxi X  X  
Hawaiixii X    
Idahoxiii X X   
Illinoisxiv X   X 
Indianaxv X    
Iowaxvi X   X 
Kansasxvii X X   
Kentuckyxviii X X   
Louisianaxix X  X  
Mainexx X X   
Marylandxxi X X   
Massachusettsxxii X X   
Michiganxxiii X    
Minnesotaxxiv X X  X 
Mississippi     
Missourixxv X X   
Montanaxxvi X    
Nebraskaxxvii X    
Nevadaxxviii X    
New Hampshirexxix X X  X 
New Jerseyxxx X X  X 
New Mexicoxxxi X X  X 
New Yorkxxxii X X  X 
North Carolinaxxxiii X    
North Dakota     
Ohioxxxiv X    
Oklahomaxxxv X    
Oregonxxxvi X X  X 
Pennsylvania     
Rhode Islandxxxvii X    
South Carolinaxxxviii X    




















South Dakotaxxxix X   X 
Tennesseexl X    
Texasxli X X   
Utahxlii X    
Vermontxliii X X   
Virginiaxliv X    
Washingtonxlv X    
West Virginiaxlvi X    
Wisconsinxlvii X X   
Wyomingxlviii X    
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